Title Games of Strategy, 5/e (International Student Edition)
Author Avinash Dixit, Susan Skeath, David McAdams
ISBN 9780393422207
List price USD 75.00
Price outside India Available on Request
Original price
Binding Paperback
No of pages 768
Book size 184 X 254 mm
Publishing year 2021
Original publisher W. W. Norton & Company
Published in India by .
Exclusive distributors Viva Books Private Limited
Sales territory India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, .
Status New Arrival
About the book


Comprehensive, clear, and approachable, with clever real-world examples that motivate students

Games of Strategy is beloved by students and instructors alike for its flexible organization, focus on problem-solving, and engaging and accessible examples from diverse fields, like political science, biology, and business. The completely revised Fifth Edition adds the work of David McAdams, especially in the areas of market design and auction theory, and provides new insights into diverse applications, such as billion-dollar buy-outs, job offer negotiation, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and collusion in the school milk market.



Relevant and relatable examples and cases engage students

Games of Strategy, Fifth Edition, has the most engaging, student-oriented examples on the market. Students explore a variety of topics, such as how Congress and the Federal Reserve interact when setting fiscal and monetary policy, what we can learn from data gathered by Wimbeldon’s new ball tracking system “Hawkeye,” and side-blotched lizards in California. Students can also delve into issues concerning student life, such as grade inflation and why roommates wait for the other to buy the common items (soap, ketchup, etc.) and, therefore, why they always run out.


Reflects the latest research, especially insights in auction theory and market design

The Fifth Edition has been thoroughly updated to include examples of the latest research, highlighting new applications in business, medicine, and day-to-day interactions.


Revised problems that provide engaging assignments for student practice

Games of Strategy helps students apply what they have learned to problems in the real world. This text has always had an engaging selection of problems for instructors to use, including some with solutions provided for students. The new edition continues with problems based on new applications.




Part One: Introduction and General Principles

Chapter 1: Basic Ideas and Examples • What is a Game of Strategy? • Some Examples and Stories of Strategic Games • Which Passing Shot? • The GPA Rat Race • “We Can’t Take the Exam because We Had a Flat Tire” • Why Are Professors So Mean? • Roommates and Families on the Brink • The Dating Game • Our Strategy for Studying Games of Strategy

Chapter 2: How to Think about Strategic Games • Strategic Games • Classifying Games • Are Players’ Interests in Total Alignment, Total Conflict, or a Mix of Both? • Are the Moves in the Game Sequential or Simultaneous? • Are the Rules of the Game Fixed or Manipulable? • Do the Players Have Full or Equal Information? • Is the Game Played Once or Repeatedly, and with the Same or Changing Opponents? • Are Agreements to Cooperate Enforceable? • Some Terminology and Background Assumptions • Strategies • Payoffs • Rationality • Common Knowledge of Rules • Equilibrium • Dynamics and Evolutionary Games • Observation and Experiment • The Uses of Game Theory • The Structure of the Chapters to Follow • Summary • Key Terms • Exercises


Part Two: Fundamental Concepts and Techniques

Chapter 3: Games with Sequential Moves • Game trees • Nodes, Branches, and Paths of Play • Uncertainty and “Nature’s Moves” • Outcomes and Payoffs • Strategies • Tree Construction • Solving Games By Using Trees • Adding More Players’ • Order Advantages • Adding More Moves” • Tic-Tac-Toe • Checkers • Chess • Go • Evidence Concerning Rollback • Summary • Key Terms • Exercises

Chapter 4: Simultaneous-Move Games - Discrete Strategies • Depicting Simultaneous-Move Games With Discrete Strategies • Nash Equilibrium • Some Further Explanation of the Concept of Nash Equilibrium • Nash Equilibrium as a System of Beliefs and Choices • Dominance • Both Players Have Dominant Strategies • One Player Has a Dominant Strategy • Successive Elimination of Dominated Strategies • Stronger and Weaker Forms of Dominance • Superdominance • Weak Dominance • Best-Response Analysis • Identifying Best Responses • Ordinal Payoffs • Three Players • Multiple Equilibria in Pure Strategies’ • Pure Coordination: Will Holmes Meet Watson? • Assurance: Will Holmes Meet Watson? And Where? • Battle of the Sexes: Will Holmes Meet Watson? And Where? • Chicken: Will James Meet Dean? • No Equilibrium in Pure Strategies • Summary • Key Terms • Exercises

Chapter 5: Simultaneous-Move Games - Continuous Strategies, Discussion, and Evidence • Pure Strategies That Are Continuous Variables • Price Competition • Some Economics of Oligopoly • Political Campaign Advertising • General Method for Finding Nash Equilibria • Critical Discussion of the Nash Equilibrium Concept • The Treatment of Risk in Nash Equilibrium • Multiplicity of Nash Equilibria • Requirements of Rationality for Nash Equilibrium • Rationalizability • Applying the Concept of Rationalizability • Rationalizability Can Take Us All the Way to Nash Equilibrium • Empirical Evidence Concerning Nash Equilibrium • Laboratory Experiments • Real-World Evidence • Summary • Key Terms • Exercises • Appendix: Finding a Value to Maximize a Function

Chapter 6: Combining Sequential and Simultaneous Moves • Games With Both Simultaneous And Sequential Moves • Two-Stage Games and Subgames • Configurations of Multistage Games • Changing the Order of Moves in a Game • What Determines the Order of Moves? • Moving First versus Moving Second • How One Player Can Change the Order of Moves • Alternative Method of Analysis • Illustrating Simultaneous-Move Games Using Game Trees • Showing and Analyzing Sequential-Move Games Using Game Tables • Three-Player Games • Summary • Key Terms • Exercises

Chapter 7: Simultaneous-Move Games: Mixed Strategies • What is a Mixed Strategy? • Mixing Moves • The Benefit of Mixing • Best Responses and Equilibrium • Nash Equilibrium as a System of Beliefs and Responses • Mixing in Non-Zero-Sum Games • Will Holmes Meet Watson? Assurance, Pure Coordination, and Battle of the Sexes • WillJames Meet Dean? Chicken • General Discussion Of Mixed-Strategy Equilibria • Weak Sense of Equilibrium • Counterintuitive Changes in Mixture Probabilities with Changes in Payoffs • Risky and Safe Choices in Zero-Sum Games • Mixing When One Player Has Three or More Pure Strategies • A General Case • Exceptional Cases • Mixing When Both Players Have Three Strategies • Full Mixtures of All Strategies • Equilibrium Mixtures with Some Strategies Unused • How to Use Mixed Strategies in Practice • Evidence on Mixing • Zero-Sum Games • Non-Zero-Sum Games • Summary • Key Terms • Exercises • Appendix: Working with Probabilities • The Basic Algebra of Probabilities • The Addition Rule • The Multiplication Rule • Expected Values • Summary • Key Terms


Part Three: Some Broad Classes of Strategies and Games

Chapter 8: Strategic Moves • A Classification of Strategic Moves • Unconditional Strategic Moves • The Role of Feasibility, Framing, and Credibility • Commitments • Threats and Promises • Making of a Threat: U.S.-Japan Trade Relations • Making of a Promise: The Restaurant Pricing Game • Making a Combined Threat and Promise: Joint U.S.-China Political Action • Some Additional Topics • When Do Strategic Moves Help? • Deterrence versus Compellence • Making Your Strategic Moves Credible • Reduce Your Freedom of Action • Change Your Payoffs • Countering Your Opponent’s Strategic Moves • Appear Irrational • Cut Off Communication • Leave Escape Routes Open • Undermine Your Opponent’s Motive to Uphold His Reputation • Use Salami Tactics • Summary • Key Terms • Exercises

Chapter 9: Uncertainty and Information • Strategies for Dealing With Risk • Sharing of Risk • Paying to Reduce Risk • Manipulating Risk in Contests • Asymmetric Information: Basic Ideas • Direct Communication, or “Cheap Talk” • Perfectly Aligned Interests • Totally Conflicting Interests • Partially Aligned Interests • Adverse Selection, Signaling, and Screening • Adverse Selection and Market Failure • The Market for “Lemons” • Signaling and Screening: Sample Situations • Experimental Evidence • Signaling in the Labor Market • Screening to Separate Types • Pooling of Types • Many Types • Equilibria in Two-Player Signaling Games • Basic Model and Payoff Structure • Separating Equilibrium • Pooling Equilibrium • Semiseparating Equilibrium • Two-Way Asymmetric Information and Dynamic Chicken • Two-way Asymmetric Information in Chicken • Two-Way Asymmetric Information in a Large Population • Dynamic Chicken: Wars of Attrition and Brinkmanship • Summary • Key Terms • Exercises • Appendix: Inferring Probabilities from Observing Consequences

Chapter 10: The Prisoners’ Dilemma and Repeated Games • The Basic Game (Review) • Changing the Way Moves Are Made: Repetition • Finite Repetition • Infinite Repetition • Games of Unknown Length • General Theory • Changing the Order of Moves: Promises • Changing Payoffs: Penalties and Rewards • Changing Payoffs: Leadership • Experimental Evidence • Real-World Dilemmas • Evolutionary Biology • Price Matching • International Environmental Policy • Summary • Key Terms • Exercises • Appendix: Infinite Sums

Chapter 11: Collective-Action Games • Collective-Action Games With Two Players • Collective Action as a Prisoners’ Dilemma • Collective Action as Chicken • Collective Action as Assurance • Collective Inaction • Collective-Action Problems in Large Groups • Multiplayer Prisoners’ Dilemma • Multiplayer Chicken • Multiplayer Assurance • Spillover Effects, Or Externalities • Commuting and Spillover Effects • Spillover Effects: The General Case • Commuting Revisited: Negative Externalities • Positive Spillover Effects • A Brief History of Ideas • The Classics • Modern Approaches and Solutions • Applications • “Help!”: A Game Of Chicken With Mixed Strategies • Summary • Key Terms • Exercises

Chapter 12: Evolutionary Games • The Framework • Some Classic Games in an Evolutionary Setting • Prisoners’ Dilemma • Comparing the Evolutionary and Rational-Player Models • Chicken • Assurance • Soccer Penalty Kicks • Multiplayer Evolutionary Games • The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma • Twice-Repeated Play • Threefold Repetition • Multiple Repetitions • The Hawk-Dove Game • Rational Strategic Choice and Equilibrium • Evolutionary Stability for V>C • Evolutionary Stability for V<C • V<C: Stable Polymorphic Population • V<C: Each Player Mixes Strategies • Some General Theory • Evolution of Cooperation and Altruism • Summary • Key Terms • Exercises


Part Four: Applications to Specific Strategic Situations

Chapter 13: Brinkmanship - The Cuban Missile Crisis • A Brief Narrative of Events • A Simple Game-Theoretic Explanation • Brinkmanship With Well-Controlled Risk • When Is a Simple Threat Too Large? • The Probabilistic Threat • Brinkmanship With Uncontrolled Risk: A Game of Dynamic Chicken • Practicing Brinkmanship • Summary • Key Terms • Exercises

Chapter 14: Design of Incentives • Price Discrimination • Some Terminology • Information-Revealing Contracts • Highway Construction: Full Information • Highway Construction: Asymmetric Information • Evidence Concerning Information-Revelation Mechanisms • Incentives for Effort: The Simplest Case • Managerial Supervision • Insurance Provision • Incentives for Effort: Evidence and Extensions • Nonlinear Incentive Schemes • Incentives in Teams • Multiple Tasks and Outcomes • Incentives over Time • Summary • Key Terms • Exercises

Chapter 15: Auctions, Bidding Strategy, and Auction Design • What Are Auctions? • More Than Just Buying and Selling • Auction Formats • Information in Auctions • The Winner’s Curse • Bidding in Auctions • Ascending-Price (“English”) Auction • Descending-Price (“Dutch”) Auction • First-Price Auction • Second-Price Auction • All-Pay Auction • War of Attrition • Auction Design • Reserve Prices • Bidder Attitudes Toward Risk • Common Values and Correlated Estimates • Incorrect Beliefs about the Game • Collusion • Further Reading • Summary • Key Terms • Exercises • Appendix: Computing Bidding Equilibria • Math Facts • Second-Price Auction Revenue with Any Reserve • Optimal Reserve Price • Equilibrium Bidding Strategies in the First-Price Auction • Equilibrium Bidding Strategies in the All-Pay Auction

Chapter 16: Strategy and Voting • Voting Rules and Procedures • Binary Methods • Plurative Methods • Mixed Methods • Voting Paradoxes • The Condorcet Paradox • The Agenda Paradox • The Reversal Paradox • Change the Voting Method, Change the Outcome • Evaluating Voting Systems • Black’s Condition • Robustness • Intensity Ranking • Strategic Voting • Plurality Rule • Pairwise Voting • Strategic Voting with Incomplete Information • Scope for Strategic Voting • The Median Voter Theorem • Discrete Political Spectrum • Continuous Political Spectrum • Summary • Key Terms’ • Exercises •

Chapter 17: Bargaining • The Nash Cooperative Solution • Numerical Example • General Theory • Variable-Threat Bargaining • Alternating-Offers Model I: Total Value Decays • Alternating-Offers Model II: Impatience • Experimental Evidence • Manipulating Information in Bargaining • Bargaining With Many Parties and Issues • Multi-Issue Bargaining • Multiparty Bargaining • Summary • Key Terms • Exercises



About the Authors:

Avinash K. Dixit is Emeritus John J.F. Sherrerd University Professor of Economics at Princeton University, where he offered his popular freshman course in game theory. He is among the world’s leading economists, having made fundamental contributions in several major fields as well as in game theory. He is the author of many books, including Dixit/Nalebuff: Thinking Strategically (Norton, 1991), Dixit/Pindyck: Investment Under Uncertainty (Princeton University Press, 1994), and Dixit/Nalebuff: The Art of Strategy (Norton, 2009).

Susan Skeath is Professor of Economics at Wellesley College, where she teaches a number of courses in microeconomics and a course in game theory, which she introduced into the school’s curriculum. She conducts research in international trade theory, and is currently working on a new Intermediate Microeconomics text with her colleague Ann Velenchik. Professor Skeath earned her doctorate at Princeton University.

David McAdams is a professor at the Duke University Fuqua School of Business. He is a leading scholar, popular teacher, and game-theory business consultant. He lives with his wife and children in Durham, North Carolina.

Target Audience:

This book is intended for under graduate economics students and academicians.

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